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End-to-end encryption

An end-to-end encrypted record is readable on the account's trusted devices, by workspace members given access, and by recipients holding a complete encrypted share address. The app encrypts its value before upload, and the server stores it without being able to read it, so a stolen database, a backup or a curious operator reveals nothing of that value.

The feature is in alpha and has not yet been reviewed by an independent cryptographer. It is managed under Settings → End-to-end encryption.

Turning it on

Turn on creates the keys for this device and a recovery key. The recovery key is shown once, as groups of characters; the last two groups are typed back to confirm it was saved. It restores access if every device is lost, and nobody can reset it, not even the server operator.

After that, a record is encrypted with the End-to-end encrypted toggle when it is created, or with Encrypt end to end on an existing record. Edit on a record offers the same choice as Encrypt this value. Stop encrypting makes the value readable to the server again.

Aliases cannot be encrypted. Other members of the workspace can read encrypted records once they are given access. A share link can also give access without an account, as described below.

Encrypted files

A file is encrypted the same way, with Encrypt this file when it is added or Encrypt end to end on an existing file. Its name and type are encrypted with it; the server stores the content as encrypted.bin, padded so that only its rough size shows. Renaming keeps the stored file, and replacing the content encrypts the new one under a new key. Stop encrypting uploads the file in plain form again.

In this alpha:

  • Encrypted files can be up to 50 MB, since the app encrypts them in memory.
  • They are opened in the app only. Share links, the link page and connected tools do not offer them yet; shares that stamp their files never will, because the server cannot read a file to stamp it.
  • Members do not see each other's files, encrypted or not.

A link carrying encrypted entries ends in #k=…. This is its address key; the complete address opens the values in the app or an HTTPS browser, with no account or account encryption keys required. The browser never sends the part after # in its request. The server stores the encrypted value and a wrapped value key, and does not receive the address key.

The usual password, view limit, expiration, verified-viewer requirement and revocation still apply. An edit in the vault renews the encrypted entries on live links. Plain entries on a mixed link continue to open independently.

  • This link is incomplete means the address lacks its key.
  • The key of this link was replaced means that key no longer opens it.
  • An unavailable entry stays locked until the link is renewed; an older value is never substituted for it.

Encrypting an entry already on links preserves the links whose keys this device can open. A link getting its first encrypted entry gets an address key; copies sent earlier need the new complete address. A link whose last encrypted entry is removed or stops being encrypted is shared without the key. It keeps the key, and an encrypted entry added later brings the same key back into its address.

Web & API formats leave encrypted entries out. The server holds only their ciphertext and never receives the address key, so a script fetching these addresses, for example with curl, cannot read them. Other links require confirmation before losing the entry, and their owners are notified. An alias or a server-created request/sign-in grant cannot carry the encryption.

Replace link key on the share's page replaces the key and every encrypted entry's seal together. Old addresses no longer open those encrypted entries; the slug stays the same and plain entries remain accessible. Duplicate creates an independent key. Replacing a key or revoking a link cannot remove values a recipient already copied.

Saved encrypted shares

Bookmark saves the address key encrypted under the viewer's account key when account encryption is ready. Trusted devices of that account can reopen it from Shares → Received, including through search. Other workspace members and the server cannot open the saved key. Copy link includes it.

Without account encryption, the key stays in this device's secure storage; only the bookmark pointer syncs. The save confirmation says that the key is saved on this device only. When encryption becomes available, opening the share again can sync its wrapped key. A copied complete replacement address updates a saved key only after an encrypted entry opens successfully.

For saved shares, this device remembers the highest authenticated version and the ciphertext of that version. Older versions, conflicting ciphertext at the same version, and unexpected plaintext for a previously encrypted entry stay closed. This history is local: a fresh device has no earlier version to compare, and missing entries cannot prove when a share changed. A legitimately unencrypted entry also triggers the plaintext check. Browser readers have no remembered version history.

Handing encrypted links to tools

Encrypted entries in a proposal start unticked. Selecting them creates a share for the owner; it does not give the tool its address key. For a connected tool allowed to receive links, Hand this encrypted link to … is a separate choice, off by default and valid for that proposal only. It explicitly allows the tool to read, copy and store every encrypted value on that link. Changing the selected entries clears the choice.

With approval, the app returns the complete address in the fragment of the tool's same-origin callback. It is not placed in a request query or stored in a connection response. Polling alone cannot deliver the key, so this explicit hand-over opens the callback even for a polling proposal. A tool without a callback cannot receive an encrypted link this way. Plain hidden values and files continue to require manual sharing.

Devices

Only devices on the account’s device list receive its encryption keys. A new device joins in one of three ways:

Way How
Another device On the new device, Add this device shows a code. On a device already on the list, Add a device scans or pastes it, and both show the same short code to compare. That device then shows a confirmation code, entered on the new device to finish.
A passkey A passkey connected to encryption opens the records on any device signed in with it. Connect your passkey connects the one used to sign in. Some passkeys cannot do this.
The recovery key Use your recovery key gives this device access and removes every other device from the list. They must be added again.

The device list carries more than record keys: the private keys of identities travel over it too, encrypted the same way, so every trusted device can sign and present attestations.

Remove takes a device or passkey off the list. It can read nothing encrypted from then on, but keeps copies of what it already read, so a secret that matters should be changed. A removed device stays signed in until Sign out everywhere else ends its session.

An entry added from another device appears under New on the device list; That was me confirms it, and an unknown device should be removed. A change this device cannot confirm shows The device list changed, and the device stops encrypting and sharing keys until it is resolved.

Members and fingerprints

Every member who turned on encryption has a fingerprint: six groups of five digits, shown under Settings → End-to-end encryption, next to each member and as Your fingerprint. It is derived from where that account's device list starts, so it stays the same as devices are added and removed and as the recovery key is replaced. Only Start over gives an account a new one.

The first device list seen for a member is remembered on this device. Each member is shown as Not verified, Verified, Keys changed, Failed verification or Encryption off:

  • Compare fingerprints opens both numbers. Compared in person or on a call, not through the app, a match is marked with They match and the member is shown as verified.
  • Keys changed means the member's list no longer grows from the one this device remembered. That is expected after they started over; it is also what a server presenting keys of its own would look like. Accept new keys remembers the new list, which is then not verified.
  • An alert appears when other members are shown a list for this account that does not start where this device's own list does.

Giving members access

A member who can read the vault and has turned on encryption is shown as Waiting for access until one of their devices holds the workspace's key. A member who can invite others gives it with Give access, from a device that holds it. Their devices then hold the key the workspace's encrypted records are written under, and their own new devices receive it the usual way. Members are shown each other's records only in sections shared with members; there, encrypted records open for those given access.

  • Giving access after comparing fingerprints is the safe path. Give access without comparing is offered too; it trusts the server's word that the keys shown are the member's own.
  • On the receiving side, a key handed over is used only once the giver's fingerprint has been compared. Until then Access waits for a fingerprint names who gave it, and a notification links there.
  • When a new key is made, for example after a device was removed, a member who can invite carries everyone who had the old one along. A member who cannot invite leaves that to someone who can, since replacing it alone would cut the others off; encrypted writes wait until then.
  • Removing a member, or taking away their permission to read the vault, takes the key away and makes a new one due. They keep whatever they already read.
  • Identity private keys are never part of this: they travel under a key only their owner's devices hold.

Recovery key

Replace recovery key issues a new one; only one is valid at a time. Without a recovery key, losing every device means losing every encrypted record. Nobody can restore them, and the app says so.

What stays readable to the server

Only the value is encrypted, and for a file its content, name and media type. The server still sees each record's label, key and type, its sections, when it changed, and roughly how large it is. An encrypted record's value on the server is always empty. See what the server can and can't see.

Starting over

Start over is for when every device and the recovery key are lost. It requires typing a confirmation phrase, then clears the device list and permanently deletes every encrypted record that nobody else can read. Other records are not affected. A notification records the reset, and a device that knew the old list treats the new one as untrusted until I started over: rejoin is chosen there.

Limits

  • Encrypting an existing record does not erase the past: server backups may still hold the old value.
  • Members without encryption access see a locked row. Full share addresses also open encrypted values in the app or an HTTPS browser.
  • The server supplies the browser page: a modified page could capture the address key. The installed app does not depend on that page.
  • A dishonest server can preserve old link state or delay revocation. A saved share’s local version history detects some replays; a fresh browser does not.
  • A former member holding a complete share address is still a link recipient. Replacing its key or revoking it ends future access on an honest server.
  • Whoever can invite members can also give access. A member who gives access without comparing fingerprints trusts the server for that one grant.
  • A device with malware on it is not protected.
  • Whoever can use a connected passkey holds the key, including anyone a passkey provider or shared password manager syncs it to. The sign-in page that unlocks it is served by the server, so a server serving a modified page could capture it.
  • Every device on the list has equal power. A stolen device can remove the others; the owner sees an alert, and the recovery key is the way back.
  • A dishonest server can delay news of a change to the device list, and on a fresh device can show an encrypted record as unencrypted. The End-to-end encrypted badge is the signal to check.

Developers can find the API in Encrypted links and the API reference.